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Theses
•	 For the first time in the history of independent Ukraine, seven months 
before the presidential election, it is difficult to determine not only 
which candidate is most likely to win, but also which candidates will 
make it to the second round.	It now seems impossible that any politi-
cian will win in the first round (to be held on 31 March 2019),	as	accord-
ing	to	the	opinion	polls	all	 the	contenders	have	relatively	 low	public	sup-
port	(see	Appendix).	In	addition,	apart	from	Yulia	Tymoshenko,	the	former	
Prime	Minister	who	is	currently	leading	the	polls,	and	Anatoly	Tyahnybok,	
the	 former	defence	minister	and	second	most	popular	candidate,	 the	dif-
ferences	in	support	for	the	other	serious	candidates	–	including	incumbent	
President	Petro	Poroshenko,	the	populist	Oleh	Lyashko	and	the	pro-Russian	
candidate	Yuriy	Boyko	–	are	negligible,	often	at	the	level	of	statistical	error.
•	 All	the	opinion	polls	clearly	show	that	Yulia	Tymoshenko	has	the	most	sup-
port.	The	other	 important	candidates	change	positions	depending	on	 the	
time	and	place	of	the	poll,	but	their	support	is	running	on	average	at	less	
than	half	of	that	for	the	former	premier.	More	than	20%	of	the	voters	do	not	
know,	or	do	not	want	to	reveal	who	they	will	vote	for;	more	than	10%	would	
choose	someone	who	is	not	mentioned	in	the	polls,	and	almost	half	would	
look	for	alternatives	among	new	candidates.	In	addition,	the	electoral	cam-
paign,	the	active	phase	of	which	will	begin	in	September,	has	been	taking	
place	in	an	atmosphere	of	considerable	distrust	on	the	part	of	Ukrainian	
society	towards	public	institutions,	the	government	and	the	political	class.	
Although	this	is	not	a	new	phenomenon	in	Ukraine,	the	‘revolution	of	dig-
nity’	also	aroused	expectations	that	the	politicians	were	unable	to	meet.
•	 In Ukraine there is a great demand for new faces and people who have 
not been compromised by participating in politics.	Currently,	there	is	
speculation	about	a	clash	in	the	elections	between	two	candidates	not	as-
sociated	with	current	politics:	Svyatoslav	Vakarchuk,	the	leader	of	the	cult	
rock	band	Okean Elzy,	who	represents	the	pro-reform	and	pro-Western	op-
tion;	and	the	satirist	Volodymyr	Zelensky,	who	hosts	a	popular	programme	
on	 the	 1+1	TV	station	owned	by	 the	oligarch	 Ihor	Kolomoisky.	Neither	of	
them	has	announced	a	run	in	the	election,	but	some	of	their	public	activi-
ties	could	be	read	as	expressing	a	desire	to	participate.	Both	have	the	sup-
port	of	around	15	to	17%	of	the	voters.	If	they	ultimately	decide	not	to	start	
in	the	elections,	their	choice	of	favourites	from	among	the	registered	can-
didates	will	be	of	considerable	importance	to	undecided	voters.
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•	 The main contenders, apart from the pro-Russian candidates, basi-
cally do not differ in their declared views concerning the country’s 
strategic development. Each	 of	 them	 has	 declared	 their	 support	 for	
Ukraine’s	integration	with	the	EU	and	NATO,	for	continuing	the	reforms	
and	modernising	Ukraine’s	political-economic	model	along	Western	lines,	
and	for	the	reintegration	of	occupied	Crimea	and	parts	of	the	Donbas.	It	is	
worth	emphasising	that	since	2014,	as	a	result	of	the	conflict	with	Russia	
and	 the	de facto	 loss	of	 these	 territories,	the pro-Russian option, while 
still strong in southern and eastern regions, has been substantially 
weakened on the national level, and can only rely on about 15–20% of 
the vote.
•	 The	low	support	for	the	current	major	contenders	for	the	presidency,	the	
high	proportion	of	voters	who	have	declared	their	readiness	to	vote	but	have	
not	yet	decided	who	to	vote	for,	and	the	lack	of	any	clearly	defined	electoral	
strategies	at	this	early	stage	of	the	campaign,	all	make it difficult to pre-
dict the possible result of the election.	As	a	result,	the	final	composition	
of	the	presidential	election’s	second	round	may	be	decided	by	unexpected	
events	(scandals,	disasters,	increased	activity	in	the	military	operations	in	
the	Donbas,	etc.)	that	could	occur	in	the	run-up	to	the	election.
•	 All	 the	 major	 candidates	 for	 President,	 including	 the	 poll	 leaders,	 have	
their	strengths	and	weaknesses.	The	 leader	Yulia Tymoshenko benefits	
from	 the	 fact	 that	 her	 political	 party	Batkivshchyna	 (Homeland)	 has	 the	
most	extensive	network	of	local	structures.	This	party	is	one	of	the	oldest	
and	most	active	in	Ukraine,	has	high	recognition,	and	is	well	rooted	in	the	
voters’	consciousness,	so	the	former	Prime	Minister	can	appeal	to	her	core	
electorate,	mainly	in	small	towns.	These	are	mostly	older	people,	who	turn	
out	for	elections	in	a	disciplined	manner.	Tymoshenko	has	been	effectively	
criticising	 the	 current	 government	 for	 raising	municipal	 fees;	 she	 is	not	
ostentatious	in	displaying	her	personal	wealth,	and	has	not	become	entan-
gled	in	corruption	scandals.	She	is	the	beneficiary	of	the	errors,	omissions	
and	painful	changes	made	by	the	government	since	the	revolution.	If	there	
is	a	 low	turnout	and	a	 large,	uniform	dispersal	of	votes	among	the	other	
candidates,	Tymoshenko	could	gain	an	advantage	which	will	make	her	en-
try	into	the	second	round	more	probable.
•	 At	the	same	time,	Tymoshenko has many limitations that may prevent 
her from winning.	First,	she	is	one	of	the	longest-standing	politicians	on	
the	Ukrainian	political	scene,	and	the	current	public	sentiment	does	not	
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favour	 such	 candidates.	 Secondly,	 although	 it	has	been	difficult	 to	prove	
her	 participation	 in	 corruption	 scandals,	 it	 has	 been	 equally	 difficult	 to	
estimate	 the	size	or	establish	 the	origin	of	her	undoubtedly	 large	assets.	
Tymoshenko	is	also	the	subject	of	many	allegations	of	corruption	and	reap-
ing	the	benefits	of	obscure	financial	schemes	from	as	far	back	as	the	late	
1990s,	when	she	became	the	head	of	the	United	Energy	System	of	Ukraine	
(YESU).	Thirdly,	the	former	Prime	Minister	has	a	huge	negative	rating	of	
nearly	30	percent	of	voters	who	would	not	vote	for	her	under	any	circum-
stances,	effectively	making	it	difficult	to	broaden	her	electoral	base	beyond	
her	core	electorate.	To	counteract	this,	Tymoshenko	has	already	officially	
begun	her	campaign,	making	speeches	targeted	at	the	middle	and	urban	
classes	while	still	full	of	populism,	in	which	she	has	unsuccessfully	sought	
to	promote	herself	as	a	modern	technocrat.	Fourthly,	Tymoshenko	also	suf-
fers	from	the	odium	of	her	obscure	relationship	with	Vladimir	Putin,	both	
from	the	election	campaign	in	2009-10,	and	from	behind	the	scenes	of	the	
gas	agreement	she	concluded	which	proved	unfavourable	for	Ukraine,	not	
to	mention	her	 long-time	collaboration	with	Viktor	Medvedchuk,	a	close	
associate	of	Putin.	Although at present	Tymoshenko may be considered 
the strongest contender in the presidential race, one should also bear 
her limitations in mind, as well as the fact that the presidential camp 
and its state & propaganda machine has not yet started its campaign 
to discredit the former Prime Minister.
•	 The	second	most	popular	candidate	is	Anatoliy Hrytsenko,	a	reserve	colo-
nel,	 a	 former	deputy,	 a	 former	defence	minister	 (2005-7),	 and	 chairman	
and	head	of	the	Civic	Position	party.	Hrytsenko’s	high	ratings	derive	from	
the	fact	that	he	combines	the	features	of	a	strong	personality	and	a	military	
man	(which	will	be	relevant	in	case	of	war	with	Russia),	and	at	the	same	
time	that	of	an	experienced	politician,	albeit	one	who	is	not	yet	of	the	first	
rank,	and	who	has	not	become	entangled	in	corruption	scandals.	In	urban	
circles,	his	popularity	is	also	boosted	by	the	fact	that	he	is	married	to	Yulia	
Mostova,	a	well-known	and	esteemed	intellectual	and	journalist,	and	head	
of	the	influential	Dzerkalo Tyzhnia	weekly.	Hrytsenko’s	advantage	include	
his	 low	negative	 rating	 (less	 than	9%),	 and	 in	 simulations	of	 the	 second-
round	 runoff,	 he	would	 beat	 all	 the	 other	 candidates.	At	 the	 same	 time,	
Hrytsenko’s	financial	resources	are	both	unclear	and	insignificant,	as	evi-
denced	by	his	 lack	of	activity	 in	 the	public	 space.	Hrytsenko,	unlike	Ty-
moshenko	or	Poroshenko,	is	not	a	man	of	means,	so	he	will	be	forced	to	find	
a	‘sponsor’	or	‘group	of	sponsors’,	without	which	he	will	not	be	able	to	run	
an	effective	campaign.	It	seems	at	present	that	support for Hrytsenko is 
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based mainly on the fact that he has poor name recognition (although 
that recognition is positively associated), as well as his military expe-
rience, and his lack of a corrupt past or any connections to oligarchs.	
His	image	has	been	positively	influenced	by	his	attempts	to	gather	around	
himself	the	most	important	pro-reform	forces	from	both	inside	and	outside	
parliament.	At	the	same	time,	however,	this	perception	may	change	when	
–	as	seems	inevitable	–	his	agreements	with	his	‘sponsors’	come	to	light,	and	
when	the	presidential	camp’s	campaign	begins	its	active	phase.
•	 Although	the	incumbent	President	Petro Poroshenko	comes	only	fourth	
or	fifth	in	the	polls,	his real power also lies in the formal and informal 
influences arising from the office he holds.	The	head	of	state,	at	least	at	
this	stage,	has the support of the most powerful Ukrainian oligarchs 
and the media they control (mainly	television	stations,	which	are	the	pri-
mary	source	of	information	for	90%	of	the	population).	During	the	active	
phase	of	the	campaign,	his	result	may	also	be	influenced	by	local	govern-
ment	at	the	provincial	and	district	levels,	as	well	as	by	some	of	the	mayors	
of	the	largest	cities,	and	parliamentary	deputies	from	single-mandate	con-
stituencies,	 to	whom	Poroshenko	will	propose	beneficial	 cooperation	 for	
the	post-electoral	period.	The	current	low	public	support	for	the	president	
derives	 partly	 from	 overly	 inflated	 social	 expectations	 after	 the	 ‘revolu-
tion	of	dignity’,	and	partly	 from	unrealised	promises	and	the	corruption	
scandals	in	which	his	closest	business	partners	are	implicated.	For	these	
reasons,	unless he achieves some new, undeniable successes, the Presi-
dent’s chances of re-election will be small.	Poroshenko	has	invested	his	
hopes	in	the	merger	of	the	three	Orthodox	churches	existing	in	Ukraine	
into	a	single,	canonical	structure,	which	seems	likely	later	this	year.	If	that	
happens,	he	will	present	this	as	a	success,	although	it	is	far	from	certain	
that	this	will	provide	him	with	the	increased	support	needed	to	guarantee	
his	victory	in	the	elections.
•	 Poroshenko’s	 signs	of	weakness	have	not	gone	unnoticed	by	his	political	
partners	or	the	oligarchs,	whose	support	for	him	is	not	unconditional,	and	
who	could	choose	to	support	the	campaign	of	a	more	promising	candidate.	
Another	challenge	for	the	President	is	retaining	the	support	of	the	West,	
which	has	been	an	important	source	of	his	legitimacy	since	the	revolution.	
Although	Poroshenko	has	been	trying	to	convince	the	US	and	the	EU	that	
he	is	the	best	guarantor	of	the	pro-reform	course,	his	credibility	is	evapo-
rating,	and	the	Western	partners’	tone	towards	Kiev	is	becoming	tougher.	
Finally,	another	problem	for	the	President	is	his	high	negative	rating	(over	
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50%	at	 its	highest),	and	if	he	were	to	reach	the	second	round	of	the	elec-
tions,	he	would	 lose	to	any	other	opponent	apart	from	those	who	are	ex-
plicitly	pro-Russian.	At	 the	present	stage,	Poroshenko	seems	determined	
to	win	re-election,	but	the	situation	may	change	if	the	level	of	support	for	
him	has	fallen	to	the	level	of	statistical	error	by	the	end	of	the	year.	Hence,	
while	 this	 is	unlikely	at	 the	moment,	 it	 cannot	be	 ruled	out	 that	he	will	
abandon	his	candidacy	at	the	turn	of	2019.
•	 There	is	a	certain	probability	that,	in	favourable	circumstances,	a	candi-
date from the pro-Russian camp could	play	an	active	part in	the	battle	
to	reach	the	second	round.	There	are	currently	two	such	politicians	con-
tending	for	the	highest	office	in	the	country.	The	first	is	Yuriy	Boyko,	the	
leader	of	the	Opposition	Bloc,	a	parliamentary	party	which	is	made	of	up	of	
the	‘leftovers’	of	the	Party	of	Regions.	The	party	still	has	its	regional	struc-
tures,	mainly	in	the	east	and	south	of	the	country,	as	well	as	considerable	
financial	and	informational	resources	(the	popular	Ukraina	and	Inter	TV	
channels).	The	 second	 pro-Russian	 politician	 is	 Vadym	 Rabinovych,	 the	
leader	of	For	Life,	an	extreme	populist	party	which	has	no	political	struc-
tures,	and	whose	only	real	 resources	are	 the	NewsOne	 television	station	
and	the	extrovert	personality	of	Rabinovych	himself.	Both	politicians	to-
gether	have	almost	16%	support	in	the	polls,	and	in	recent	weeks	they	have	
taken	 action	 to	 combine	 forces.	 In	 addition,	 the	 Rabinovych	 project	 has	
the	support	of	the	Kremlin,	which	explains	the	access	to	the	party	enjoyed	
by	Putin’s	old	associate,	 the	abovementioned	Viktor	Medvedchuk.	Boyko	
and	Rabinovych	have	a	lot	of	support	in	the	east	of	the	country,	and	quite	
a	significant	amount	in	the	south.	If they can team up effectively and put 
forward a single candidate (most likely Boyko), his chances of mak-
ing it to the second round are not negligible, especially	as	the	patriotic	
and	pro-Western	electorate	is	undergoing	fragmentation.	In	addition,	if	the	
Ecumenical	Patriarch	of	Constantinople	gives	his	consent	to	the	creation	
in	Ukraine	of	a	canonical	Ukrainian	Orthodox	Church,	that	could	further	
mobilise	followers	of	the	Russian	Orthodox	Church,	that	is,	supporters	of	
the	Opposition	Bloc	and	For	Life.	Such	a	solution	may	even	be	favoured	and	
supported	by	Poroshenko’s	administration,	as	the	current	President	could	
more	easily	beat	 a	pro-Russian	candidate	 than	Yulia	Tymoshenko	 in	 the	
second	round	(assuming	he	makes	it	that	far).
•	 It is still too early to say which candidate has the best chance of be-
coming President in spring 2019.	The decisive phase of the campaign 
will begin in the autumn, and the major contenders will emerge by 
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the end of the year.	The	importance	of	March’s	presidential	election	is	so	
important	that	the	political	party	associated	with	the	winner	will	have	the	
best	chance	of	getting	a	good	–	and	perhaps	the	best	–	result	in	the	general	
elections	scheduled	for	October	2019. 
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I. BIographIes of the major candIdates
1. YULIa tYmoshenKo
Yulia	Tymoshenko	was	born	in	1960	in	Dnipropetrovsk.	Her	mother	Mariya	Hry-
hjan	(Grigian),	née	Nielepova,	was	a	Ukrainian	or	Russian	woman;	her	father	Vo-
lodymyr	Hryhjan	(Grigian),	was	a	Latvian	of	Jewish	origin	(he	took	the	surname	
of	his	mother,	an	Armenian),	who	rapidly	abandoned	his	 family.	 In	 1978,	Yulia	
started	studies	in	the	Dnipropetrovsk	Mining	Institute	(specialising	in	automa-
tion	&	telemechanics),	and	two	years	later	she	transferred	to	the	Faculty	of	Eco-
nomics	of	the	University	of	Dnipropetrovsk,	from	where	she	graduated	in	1984.	
In	1999	she	received	a	doctorate	from	the	Kiev	National	University	of	Economics.	
In	1979	she	married	Oleksandr	Tymoshenko,	and	a	year	later	gave	birth	to	a	daugh-
ter,	Yevheniya.	She	has	been	separated	from	her	husband	for	over	twenty	years.
1.1. Business career
After	graduating	Tymoshenko	worked	as	an	economist	in	the	Dnieper	Lenin	
Machine-Building	Plant	(weapons	manufacture).	In	1988	she	and	her	husband	
opened	a	video	rental	store,	which	marked	the	beginning	of	her	business	ca-
reer.	Then	she	began	to	invest	in	trading	petroleum	products	on	the	Russian	
commodity	 and	 raw	materials	 stock	market.	 From	 1991	 to	 1995	 she	was	 the	
director	of	the	Ukrayinska Benzyna	corporation,	providing	fuel	to	the	agricul-
tural	sector	in	the	Dnipropetrovsk	oblast,	initially	in	collaboration	with	Viktor	
Pinchuk,	and	later	with	Pavlo	Lazarenko,	who	was	responsible	for	agriculture	
in	the	oblast	government.	At	the	same	time,	together	with	her	father-in-law,	
and	under	Lazarenko’s	patronage,	she	created	the	United	Energy	Systems	of	
Ukraine	(YESU)	corporation.	Thanks	to	the	support	of	Lazarenko,	who	became	
deputy	prime	minister	and	then	Prime	Minister	(1995-7),	YESU	won	a	domi-
nant	position	as	a	distributor	of	Russian	natural	gas	to	Ukraine.	Tymoshenko	
assumed	a	prominent	place	among	Ukraine’s	leading	oligarchs.
1.2. Political career
In	1997	Tymoshenko	won	a	mandate	in	the	Ukrainian	parliament	and	joined	the	
then-marginal	Hromada	party,	which	was	Lazarenko’s	parliamentary	base,	and	
turned	it	 into	a	formidable	political	force.	After	Lazarenko’s	arrest	in	January	
1999,	Tymoshenko	distanced	herself	from	her	business	and	political	patron	by	
bringing	 about	 a	 split	within	Hromada	 and	 creating	 the	Batkivshchyna	 party.	
During	the	presidential	campaign	in	1999	she	joined	the	camp	of	Leonid	Kuchma.
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Towards	the	end	of	1999	she	became	part	of	the	government	of	Viktor	Yush-
chenko	as	deputy	prime	minister	for	the	fuel-energy	sector.	She	was	sacked	in	
February	2001,	and	then	arrested	on	charges	of	arranging	the	illegal	import	of	
Russian	gas	via	YESU.	After	a	few	months	she	was	released,	and	from	then	on	
was	a	sworn	enemy	of	President	Kuchma.
In	2004	she	was	one	of	the	leaders	of	the	‘Orange	Revolution’,	declaring	to	the	
end	her	refusal	to	compromise	with	Yanukovych	or	Kuchma,	a	stance	which	
brought	her	enormous	popularity.	In	February	2005	she	became	the	head	of	the	
government,	but	soon	came	into	conflict	with	President	Yushchenko’s	 team,	
especially	with	Petro	Poroshenko,	with	whom	she	competed	for	the	position	of	
prime	minister.	In	November	2007	she	again	became	head	of	the	government.	
At	the	beginning	of	2009	there	was	a	gas	crisis	as	a	result	of	the	interruption	
of	gas	supplies	by	Russia	to	Ukraine.	The	formal	cause	of	this	dispute	was	the	
accusation	that	Kiev	had	defaulted	on	its	repayments.	A	new	gas	contract	was	
only	signed	after	several	days,	and	the	conditions	of	 this	new	contract	were	
extremely	unfavourable	for	Kiev.
In	February	2010	Tymoshenko	 lost	 the	presidential	 election	 to	Yanukovych,	
when	she	won	45.5%	of	the	vote	in	the	second	round.	A	month	after	the	elec-
tions,	the	parliament	passed	a	vote	of	no	confidence	in	her	government.	After	
a	few	weeks,	law	enforcement	authorities	initiated	a	number	of	criminal	pro-
ceedings	accusing	Tymoshenko	of	abuses	both	during	her	premiership	and	in	
her	business	activity	 (the	main	allegations	concerned	her	signing	of	 the	gas	
contract).	 In	August	2011	she	was	 temporarily	arrested,	and	 in	October	sen-
tenced	to	7	years	in	prison.	After	the	‘revolution	of	dignity’	she	was	released	on	
the	basis	of	a	special	law.
After	leaving	prison,	Tymoshenko	was	received	rather	coolly	by	the	public	and	
her	former	colleagues,	who	had	now	gained	independent	political	positions	(Ar-
seniy	Yatsenyuk,	Oleksandr	Turchynov).	While	remaining	in	the	shadow	of	cur-
rent	political	events,	Tymoshenko	has	avoided	expressing	clear	statements	and	
opinions	(for	example,	on	how	to	resolve	the	conflict	in	the	east	of	the	country,	
or	on	the	development	of	relations	with	Russia).	She	has	begun	to	rebuild	her	
party,	and	thanks	to	her	ambivalent	attitude	to	the	most	important	issues	in	the	
country,	she	has	become	the	beneficiary	of	both	the	mistakes	&	omissions	and	
the	painful	social	reforms	introduced	by	Poroshenko	and	his	team.
When	launching	her	election	campaign,	Tymoshenko	avoided	making	specif-
ic	proposals,	 and	has	 focused	on	promoting	her	new	 image	and	announcing	
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‘a	new	course	for	Ukraine’,	but	she	has	not	specified	the	details	of	her	vision	for	
the	development	of	the	country.
1.3. Further information
Tymoshenko	grew	up	 in	a	Russian-speaking	environment,	 lacking	any	na-
tional	consciousness,	and	she	only	started	to	learn	the	Ukrainian	language	
after	starting	her	political	career.	She	has	great	political	and	oratory	talent,	
and	is	a	good	organiser,	but	she	is	also	inclined	to	retaliate.	She	is	decisive,	
ambitious,	headstrong	and	ready	to	suffer.	She	has	twice	agreed	to	be	impris-
oned,	even	though	she	could	have	escaped	abroad.	An	analysis	of	her	activi-
ties	over	 the	past	 two	decades	 indicates	 that	she	has	no	declared,	constant	
political	positions	and,	 if	necessary,	she	would	be	able	to	change	them	dia-
metrically.
2. anatoLIY hrYtsenKo
Anatoliy	Hrytsenko	was	born	in	1957	in	the	village	of	Bohachivka	(Cherkasy	
oblast).	His	father	Stepan	Hrytsenko	fought	in	World	War	II.	It	was	probably	
his	father’s	example	which	lay	behind	Anatoliy’s	decision	to	start	a	military	ca-
reer.	He	has	been	married	twice,	and	has	four	children:	with	his	first	wife	Lud-
mila,	a	son	Aleksey	(born	1979)	and	a	daughter	Svitlana	(born	1982);	and	with	
his	second	wife	Yulia	Mostova,	a	well-known	and	influential	 journalist,	and	
editor	 in	chief	of	 the	weekly	Dzerkalo Tyzhnia,	a	daughter	Anna	(born	2004)	
and	a	son	Hlib	(born	1998,	from	Mostova’s	previous	marriage	to	Oleksandr	Ra-
zumkov,	and	adopted	by	Hrytsenko).
2.1. Military career
He	is	a	military	engineer,	graduating	as	a	doctor	of	technical	sciences.	In	1974	
he	graduated	from	the	Suvorov	Military	School	in	Kiev	(now	the	Ivan	Bohun	
Military	High	School	in	Kiev),	and	in	1979	from	the	Kyiv	Higher	Military	Avi-
ation	Engineering	School	 (with	honours);	he	was	a	 lecturer	 there	 from	1984	
to	1992.	His	defective	vision	prevented	him	from	making	a	career	as	a	pilot,	
and	determined	the	analytical	track	of	his	later	professional	career.	From	1992	
to	 1994,	he	was	deputy	head	of	 the	analytical	directorate	of	 the	Science	and	
Research	Centre	of	the	Armed	Forces	of	Ukraine’s	General	Staff.	At	the	same	
time	he	was	 sent	 for	 training	 to	 the	United	States,	where	 in	 1993	he	gradu-
ated	from	the	Institute	of	Foreign	Languages	of	the	Department	of	Defense,	and	
a	year	later	he	became	the	first	citizen	of	Ukraine	to	graduate	from	the	elite	Air	
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War	College.	In	1995,	he	graduated	from	the	Academy	of	the	Armed	Forces	of	
Ukraine.	In	1999	he	retired	from	military	service	with	the	rank	of	colonel.
2.2. Political career
An	important	element	in	Hrytsenko’s	life	was	his	friendship	with	Oleksandr	Ra-
zumkov,	an	adviser	 to	President	Kuchma,	as	well	 as	 the	husband	of	his	 future	
wife.	In	1997	Hrytsenko	took	over	leadership	of	the	analytical	service	of	the	Na-
tional	Security	and	Defence	Council	of	Ukraine,	 in	which	Razumkov	served	as	
deputy	secretary.	After	the	latter’s	death	of	his	superior	in	1999,	Hrytsenko	be-
came	the	head	of	the	Ukrainian	Centre	for	Economic	and	Political	Research	found-
ed	by	Razumkov	(which	since	2000	has	been	known	as	the	Razumkov	Centre).
In	2004	he	 joined	Viktor	Yushchenko’s	electoral	 team,	 in	which	he	directed	
the	 analytical	 team,	 and	 as	 such	was	 responsible	 for	 the	preparation	of	 the	
electoral	programme	and	the	reform	plan.	For	his	services	during	the	Orange	
Revolution,	Yushchenko	appointed	him	defence	minister	in	the	Tymoshenko	
government	in	February	2005.	He	retained	this	post	in	the	Yekhanurov	and	
Yanukovych	cabinets	until	December	2007.
In	the	early	general	elections	in	2007	he	ran	on	the	list	of	the	pro-presidential	
Our	Ukraine–People’s	Self-Defence	block.	In	parliament	he	became	chairman	
of	the	committee	for	security	and	defence.	As	he	himself	explained,	the	rea-
son	for	his	sacking	as	defence	minister	was	his	alleged	refusal	to	sell	land	be-
longing	to	the	ministry	to	President	Yushchenko’s	son	at	knock-down	prices.	
Thereafter,	the	relationship	between	the	politicians	cooled	off	considerably.	In	
2008	he	headed	the	Civic	Position	party,	and	two	years	later	ran	in	the	presi-
dential	elections,	in	which	he	received	1.2%	of	the	vote.	Hrytsenko’s	group	took	
part	in	the	2012	parliamentary	elections	as	part	of	the	United	Opposition	Bat-
kivshchyna	coalition	led	by	Tymoshenko,	who	at	that	time	was	still	in	prison.
In	 January	2014	Hrytsenko	criticised	the	organisation	of	 the	protests	on	the	
Maidan,	urging	the	organisers	to	take	down	the	‘tent	city’	as	support	for	the	
demonstrations	started	falling.	Just	a	few	days	later,	however,	he	called	on	peo-
ple	who	legally	owned	arms	to	protect	the	Maidan,	and	announced	that	if	at-
tempts	were	made	to	break	up	the	protests,	he	would	be	ready	to	stand	in	the	
front	line	and	offer	active	resistance	to	the	government.
In	May	2014	he	stood	again	in	the	presidential	elections,	receiving	5%	support,	
which	gave	him	fourth	place;	in	the	same	year	his	Civic	Position	party	failed	to	
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pass	the	5%	electoral	threshold	in	the	parliamentary	elections.	Since	2015	he	
has	been	a	lecturer	at	the	Kiev-Mohyla	Academy.
As	he	announced	that	he	would	run	in	the	presidential	elections	 in	2019,	he	
promised	to	defend	Ukraine	against	aggression	from	the	east,	adopted	a	hard	
stance	 towards	Russia	and	 the	self-proclaimed	republics,	 and	said	he	would	
deal	with	corruption	and	the	oligarchic	system	of	power	in	the	country.	How-
ever,	 he	 lacks	 the	 personnel	 and	 financial	 backing	 to	 carry	 out	 this	 latter	
promise	in	particular.
2.3. Additional information
He	is	a	radical	supporter	of	Ukraine’s	current	pro-Western	course;	he	supports	
membership	in	the	EU	and	NATO.	His	personality	is	characterised	by	its	inde-
cisiveness,	while	at	the	same	time	his	opinions	are	pronounced	very	categori-
cally.	His	position	during	the	Euromaidan	remains	unclear;	he	called	for	the	
protests	to	be	dissolved,	then	for	the	formation	of	armed	patrols,	and	then	for	
terrorist	acts	to	be	carried	out	in	Russia	(an	investigation	against	him	in	Russia	
is	ongoing	with	regard	to	this	latter	statement).	Although	the	allegations	that	
he	weakened	the	Ukrainian	army’s	military	potential	as	a	result	of	his	actions	
while	head	of	the	defence	ministry	are	poorly	argued	and	inconclusive,	many	
politicians	have	accused	him	of	supporting	and	participating	in	the	evacuation	
of	the	special	‘Berkut’	troops	from	government	buildings	after	President	Yanu-
kovych	fled	the	country.
3. petro poroshenKo
Petro	Poroshenko	was	born	in	1965	in	Bolgrad	(Odessa	oblast),	the	son	of	Olek-
siy	and	Yevheniya	Poroshenko.	The	future	President’s	father	was	born	in	1936	
in	Safyany	(a	village	near	Izmail)	as	a	citizen	of	Romania.	From	1982	to	1989	
Petro	Poroshenko	studied	at	the	Faculty	of	International	Relations	and	Inter-
national	Law	at	the	University	of	Kiev.	From	1989	to	1992	he	was	an	assistant	
at	that	university’s	Department	of	International	Economic	Relations.	In	2002	
he	obtained	his	doctorate	from	the	Odessa	National	Law	Academy.	During	his	
studies	(1982–4)	he	did	his	military	service	at	an	air	defence	unit	in	Aktöbe/
Aktyubinsk	(Kazakhstan),	and	later	at	the	Military	Aero-Technical	School	in	
Vasylkiv	near	Kiev.
He	 is	married	 to	Maryna	Poroshenko	 (née	Perevedentseva,	 born	 1962),	who	
graduated	 from	 the	 Kiev	Medical	 Institute	 and	 is	 the	 daughter	 of	 a	 Soviet	
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former	 deputy	 minister	 of	 health.	They	 have	 four	 children:	 Oleksiy	 (1985),	
Yevheniya	&	Oleksandra	(2000)	and	Mykhailo	(2001).	Viktor	Yushchenko	 is	
godfather	to	their	twin	daughters.
3.1. Business career
In	1993	Poroshenko	and	his	partners	(including	Ihor	Kononenko,	a	friend	from	
the	army,	and	now	one	of	his	closest	collaborators),	as	well	as	his	father	(and	
presumably	his	brother	Mykhailo),	created	the	UkrPromInvest	holding	com-
pany,	which	from	the	outset	has	specialised	in	confectionery	(and	later	other	
agricultural	processing	industries)	and	the	automotive	industry.	Poroshenko	
was	its	director-general	until	1998,	when	upon	becoming	a	parliamentary	dep-
uty	he	handed	the	position	on	to	his	father,	while	retaining	the	title	of	hon-
orary	president,	and	also	(as	it	seems)	a	decisive	influence	on	the	company’s	
business	decisions.
Between	1996	and	1998,	the	company	took	over	the	main	Ukrainian	confection-
ery	factories	and	quickly	set	them	back	on	their	feet.	In	1996	the	UkrPromIn-
vest-Konditer	 confectionery	 holding	 company	 was	 created,	 and	 renamed	
Roshen	in	2002;	this	is	Poroshenko’s	flagship	company,	which	has	factories	in	
Vinnitsa,	Kiev,	Mariupol,	Kremenchuk,	Lipetsk	(Russia),	Klaipeda	(Lithuania)	
and	Hungary.	When	he	started	his	political	activity,	Poroshenko	made	over	his	
shares	in	the	company	to	a	trust	fund,	Prime	Assets	Capital.	Forbes	magazine	
has	estimated	his	assets’	value	at	US$1	billion.
3.2. Political career
Poroshenko	started	his	political	career	 in	1997	in	the	Social	Democratic	Party	
of	Ukraine	(United),	which	was	the	political	base	for	President	Leonid	Kuchma.	
In	2000	he	lost	the	race	to	lead	the	party	to	Viktor	Medvedchuk	and	Hryhoriy	
Surkis,	 left	 the	 party	 and	 created	 his	 own,	 the	 Ukraine	 Solidarity	 Party.	 In	
the	same	year,	he	brought	his	party	into	the	new	Party	of	Regional	Revival	of	
Ukraine	(later	known	simply	as	the	Party	of	Regions).	He	was	one	of	the	party’s	
co-founders	and	leaders.	In	2001	he	left	the	Party	of	Regions	and	created	his	own	
Solidarity	party,	which	however	remained	a	marginal	 structure.	The	reasons	
for	Poroshenko’s	turnaround	are	unclear;	most	likely	it	was	a	result	of	his	re-
moval	from	the	leadership	of	the	Party	of	Regions.	At	the	end	of	2001	Poroshenko	
brought	his	party	into	the	Viktor	Yushchenko	Electoral	Bloc/Our	Ukraine,	be-
coming	one	of	Yushchenko’s	closest	collaborators.	In	2004,	he	was	deputy	chief	
of	staff	in	Yushchenko’s	election	team	and	one	of	the	sponsors	of	his	campaign.
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In	2007-9	he	was	the	chairman	of	the	board	of	the	National	Bank	of	Ukraine.	
In	2009-10	he	was	foreign	minister	in	the	Yanukovych	government,	and	from	
March	to	December	2012	he	served	as	minister	for	economic	development	and	
trade	in	the	government	of	Mykola	Azarov.
During	the	Euromaidan,	he	supported	the	protests	financially,	while	at	the	same	
time	trying	to	keep	his	distance	from	other	opposition	politicians.	During	the	
demonstrations	he	spoke	independently,	and	his	attitude	won	him	great	popu-
larity.	When	a	poll	in	March	2014	gave	him	a	significant	advantage	over	other	
potential	candidates	for	the	first	time,	he	decided	to	take	part	in	the	presidential	
elections	in	May,	which	he	won	in	the	first	round	(with	54.7%	of	the	votes).
Just	before	 the	parliamentary	elections	 in	October	2014	Poroshenko	 revived	
his	previous	party	under	the	name	of	the	Petro	Poroshenko	Bloc	(BPP),	which	
won	21.8%	of	the	votes.	After	the	resignation	of	Prime	Minister	Arseniy	Yatse-
nyuk,	Poroshenko’s	party	formed	a	government	with	the	National	Front	party	
led	by	Volodymyr	Hroysman.
3.3. Additional information
In	 his	 youth	 Poroshenko	 practiced	 judo	 and	 sambo.	 He	 is	 a	member	 of	 the	
Ukrainian	Orthodox	Church	(which	acknowledges	the	authority	of	the	Patri-
arch	of	Moscow);	the	media	agrees	that	he	is	a	sincere	believer,	regularly	at-
tending	religious	ceremonies.	He	has	had	a	magnificent	liturgical	chapel	con-
structed	at	his	residence	in	Kozin,	near	Kiev.
Poroshenko	 is	 an	 experienced	 politician	 and	 entrepreneur;	 the	 basis	 of	 his	
position	is	his	financial	independence.	He	is	cautious	and	charismatic,	but	as	
a	politician	is	more	of	an	administrator	by	nature.	He	is	a	good	speaker,	but	
tends	to	be	impulsive	and	temperamental	(some	say	downright	hysterical).	He	
is	a	strong	supporter	of	the	pro-European	option	(although	his	interests	mostly	
tie	him	to	markets	in	the	CIS).
He	speaks	English	fluently.	He	plays	tennis.	He	is	interested	in	painting,	espe-
cially	Impressionism.
4. YUrIY BoYKo
Yuriy	Boyko	was	 born	 in	 1958	 in	Horlivka	 (Donetsk	 oblast),	 the	 only	 son	 in	
a	family	whose	privacy	he	closely	guards,	avoiding	making	public	statements	
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about	them	(nothing	is	known	about	his	parents).	In	1981	he	graduated	from	
the	Mendeleev	Chemical-Technological	University	in	Moscow.	In	2001	he	also	
graduated	from	the	Volodymyr	Dal	Eastern	Ukrainian	National	University	in	
Lugansk,	obtaining	the	title	of	engineer-economist.	While	studying	in	Moscow	
he	married	his	classmate	Vera,	a	sports	champion	in	gymnastics,	with	whom	
he	has	three	sons,	Anatoliy,	Yuri	and	Mykola,	and	three	daughters,	Yaroslava,	
Ulyana	and	Maria.
4.1. Business career
After	completing	his	studies,	he	returned	to	Ukraine	and	started	working	in	
the	Zarya	chemical	plant	in	Rubizhne	(Lugansk	oblast)	producing	military	in-
dustrial	explosives.	During	his	employment	there	in	1981-1999	he	rose	through	
the	ranks	and	became	director	of	the	plant.	From	2001	he	worked	in	manage-
ment	positions	in	oil	businesses.	In	2002,	he	became	president	of	the	Naftohaz	
state	company;	however,	 three	years	 later	he	was	dismissed	by	a	decision	of	
Prime	Minister	 Tymoshenko,	who	 accused	 Boyko	 of	 having	 ties	 to	 RusUkr-
Energo,	 a	 company	which	 profited	 from	 importing	 gas	 from	 Turkmenistan	
and	Russia.	The	company,	which	was	owned	by	Gazprom	and	the	businessman	
Dmytro	Firtash,	posed	a	direct	threat	to	Tymoshenko’s	interests.	One	impor-
tant	provision	of	the	Russian-Ukrainian	gas	contract	of	2009	was	the	removal	
of	agents	trading	in	natural	gas.	In	the	course	of	an	investigation	by	the	US	De-
partment	of	Justice	in	2005,	it	came	to	light	that	Boyko,	along	with	his	business	
partner	Dmytro	 Firtash,	 had	 participated	 in	 creating	RusUkrEnergo,	which	
was	accused	of	 collaborating	with	Semyon	Mogilevich,	one	of	 the	 leaders	of	
the	Russian	mafia.
4.2. Political career
In	2001	Boyko	went	 into	politics	as	part	of	Serhiy	Tyhipko’s	oligarchic	party	
Trudova Ukraina	[Labour	Ukraine}.	From	2003	to	2005,	he	was	deputy	minis-
ter	of	fuel	and	energy	in	the	Yanukovych	government	(and	served	at	the	same	
time	as	president	of	Naftohaz).	Tymoshenko	dismissed	him	in	2005,	but	a	year	
later	he	became	the	head	of	the	Ministry	of	Fuel	and	Energy	in	the	Yanukovych	
cabinet.	In	2007	he	joined	the	Party	of	Regions	and	was	elected	as	a	deputy	on	
its	list.	In	2010	he	again	became	energy	minister	in	the	Azarov	government,	
and	from	2012	to	2014	he	was	Deputy	Prime	Minister.	In	2014	he	ran	for	Presi-
dent	of	Ukraine,	receiving	0.19%	of	 the	vote.	 In	October	of	 the	same	year	he	
became	head	of	the	Opposition	Bloc,	a	grouping	largely	made	up	of	former	poli-
ticians	from	the	Party	of	Regions.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
19
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
9/
20
18
Although	Boyko	was	a	prominent	member	of	the	Yanukovych	regime,	he	was	
not,	unlike	many	of	his	 colleagues,	 accused	of	 treason	or	 corruption.	Boyko	
was	not	on	the	list	of	persons	covered	by	sanctions,	and	the	investigations	into	
him	(concerning	the	embezzlement	of	state	resources	to	purchase	drilling	rigs	
in	2011)	have	been	discontinued.	The	Ukrainian	special	services’	lack	of	inter-
est	in	the	Opposition	Bloc’s	leader	is	most	likely	the	result	of	a	political	calcu-
lation	by	Poroshenko’s	team.	In	accordance	with	these	assumptions,	if	Boyko	
makes	it	to	the	second	round	of	the	presidential	election	he	will	be	a	conveni-
ent	rival	for	Poroshenko,	who	would	stand	a	much	greater	chance	of	winning	
against	him.
4.3. Additional information
In	politics,	Boyko	positions	himself	as	a	cool	and	rational	technocrat,	as	well	
as	being	a	strong	and	decisive	politician.	During	a	session	of	parliament,	he	
responded	to	a	suggestion	by	the	populist	Oleh	Lyashko	that	he	had	betrayed	
the	Ukrainian	state	to	Russia	in	an	unusual	fashion:	he	knocked	his	adversary	
out,	and	calmly	returned	to	his	seat	with	a	straight	face.
Boyko	 is	 generally	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 representative	 of	Russian	 interests	 in	
Ukraine.	He	favours	establishing	cooperation	and	normalising	diplomatic	rela-
tions	with	Russia	as	fast	as	possible.	He	publicly	presents	himself	as	a	pragmat-
ic	politician	interested	in	stabilising	the	situation	in	the	country	and	improv-
ing	the	living	conditions	of	ordinary	people.	He	is	an	avid	ice	hockey	player.
*
Three	 further	 candidates	 also	 enjoy	 relatively	high	 support	 in	 the	polls.	Al-
though	their	chances	of	becoming	President	are	not	 too	great,	 their	support	
of	other	candidates	may	have	a	significant	impact	on	the	course	of	next	year’s	
elections.
5.  oLeh LYashKo
He	was	born	in	Chernihiv	in	1972.	The	leader	of	the	Radical	Party	has	gained	
popularity	by	his	use	of	nationalist	and	populist	slogans,	appealing	mainly	to	
the	rural	and	poorly	educated	electorate.	He	favours	authoritarian,	strong-arm	
governments	and	a	no-holds-barred	fight	against	corruption.	He	is	funded	and	
supported	by	media	oligarchs	close	to	the	former	President	Yanukovych	(pri-
marily	Rinat	Akhmetov).
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6. VadYm raBInoVYch
He	was	born	in	Kharkov	in	1953.	He	is	President	of	the	All-Ukrainian	Congress	
of	 Jews	and	a	 founder	of	 the	European	 Jewish	Parliament.	He	 is	 the	founder	
and	leader	of	the	For	Life	party.	He	is	the	editor	in	chief	of	the	112	news	chan-
nel	(and	hosts	his	own	programme	on	it),	which	is	most	likely	controlled	by	the	
pro-Russian	politician	Viktor	Medvedchuk.	In	the	past	he	has	been	convicted	
of	arms	trafficking	and	money	laundering.
7. sVYatosLaV VaKarchUK
He	was	born	in	Mukachevo	in	1975.	He	is	the	leader	of	the	popular	rock	band	
Okean	Elzy.	He	 is	 the	 son	 of	 Ivan	Vakarchuk,	 a	 scientist,	 rector	 of	 the	 Ivan	
Franko	University	 and	 a	 former	minister	 of	 education	 and	 science.	 In	 2004	
he	became	involved	in	Yushchenko’s	electoral	campaign,	and	took	part	in	the	
Orange	Revolution	and	the	Euromaidan.	He	has	been	publicly	active	for	sev-
eral	years,	holding	meetings	and	commenting	on	current	political	events.	He	is	
a	supporter	of	the	current	pro-Western	course	of	Ukraine	and	its	membership	
in	Western	structures.	He	has	not	officially	confirmed	his	participation	in	the	
elections.
8. VoLodYmYr ZeLensKIY
He	was	born	in	Kryvyi	Rih	in	1978.	A	popular	comedian	and	actor,	co-creator	of	
the	Kvartal-95	cabaret,	and	the	sitcom	Sluga Narodu	[Servant	of	the	People]	on	
the	1+1	TV	channel	owned	by	the	oligarch	Ihor	Kolomoisky.	His	public	activity	
includes	organising	collections	and	assistance	for	soldiers	involved	in	the	con-
flict	in	the	east	of	the	country.	Little	is	known	about	his	real	political	opinions.	
From	time	to	time,	he	both	confirms	and	denies	his	participation	in	the	presi-
dential	election,	which	probably	means	the	decision	on	his	participation	in	the	
elections	has	not	yet	been	taken.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
21
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
9/
20
18
appendIx. Support for candidates in the presidential election (August 2018)
  All, %
Percentage of those 
who intend to vote ,%
percentage of those 
who intend to vote 
and have made their 
choice, %
Yulia Tymoshenko 11.1 14.4 17.7
Anatoliy Hrytsenko 6.7 8.7 10.7
Yuriy Boyko 6.4 7.2 8.9
Oleh Lyashko 5.9 6.9 8.5
Petro Poroshenko 5.3 6.8 8.3
Volodymyr Zelenskiy 6.2 6.5 8.0
Svyatoslav Vakarchuk 5.7 6.5 8.0
Vadym Rabinovych 3.7 4.8 5.9
Andriy Sadovyi 1.6 1.9 2.3
Oleh Tiahnybok 1.3 1.7 2.1
Valentyn Nalyvaichenko 1.2 1.5 1.9
Roman Bezsmertnyi 1.1 1.4 1.7
Serhiy Taruta 0.7 0.8 0.9
Arseniy Yatsenyuk 0.8 0.8 0.9
Vitaliy Skotsyk 0.3 0.3 0.3
Another candidate 9.6 11.2 13.8
Hard to say 17.4 18.8  
I would not vote 15.2    
source: Rating Group
